Newsletter ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 AUGUST, 2022 WHETHER INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE OR MATERIAL CAN BE A GROUND FOR SETTING ASIDE AN ARBITRAL AWARD? Recently, the Delhi High Court in the case titled, “M/s Scholastic India Pvt. Ltd. & anr. v. Smt. Kanta Batra and Smt. Kanta Batra v. M/s Scholastic India Pvt. Ltd. & anr” held that the Commercial Court, while setting aside the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, had clearly gone outside the ambit of Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, as it re-evaluated the sufficiency of evidence in the material furnished by the Lessor including bank statements and income tax returns and held that the Arbitral Tribunal faulted in incorrectly appreciating the sufficiency of the said material. The Delhi High Court further observed that the Arbitral Tribunal must not be subject to the Indian Evidence Act or the Code of Civil Procedure in view of Section 19(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore, an arbitral award cannot be rejected on the grounds that it is in violation of the aforementioned statutes. The Hon’ble Court was also pleased to hold that an arbitral award, which is based on no material evidence, may be rejected on the grounds of patent illegality, however, an award cannot be set aside on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or material. Read More... WHETHER THE SCOPE OF SECTION 11 OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 INCLUDES IDENTIFYING INCONSISTENCIES IN CLAUSES OF CONTRACT Recently, the Delhi High Court in the case titled, “Shristi Infrastructure Development Corp. Ltd. v. Ircon International Ltd.” held that an arbitration agreement in a contract is a separate and severable clause, with a standing of its own. In the present case, a discrepancy arose to the extent of giving precedence to the dispute settlement clause provided in the Special Conditions of Contract (SCCs) or to the arbitral clause stipulated in General Conditions of Contract (GCCs). Hereunder, the Hon’ble Court held that inconsistencies between provisions of SCC and GCC be left for the Arbitrator to decide as the same cannot be decided in a Petition filed for appointment of arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Hon’ble Court further reiterated a principle, “when in doubt, do refer” which stipulates that Court should prefer referring the dispute to arbitration if specified in the contract, whereby other party is making an attempt to invalidate the arbitration agreement by citing other provisions of contract. It was also observed that despite a reference to arbitration is being made in accordance with Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the arbitrator shall have the option to decide its jurisdiction whereby they can check if an arbitration clause exists or not in view of Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 under the kompetenz-kompetenz principle. Read More... WHETHER A WRIT IS MAINTAINABLE IF THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE EXISTS IN THE CONTRACT AND ONE OF THE PARTIES ADMITS ITS LIABILITY? Recently, the Patna High Court in the case titled, “Fulena Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.” heldthat the arbitration clause would no longer be a bar to the writ petition once the respondent had admitted its liability to pay since there is no longer any dispute that could be referred to arbitration. In the present matter, the petitioner, being aggrieved by non-payment by the Respondent with respect to an agreement, filed a civil Writ petition asking the court to direct the respondent to pay the part of consideration withheld by the Respondent, to which the Respondent also filed its counter-affidavit, wherein it  raised certain objections, but it did not dispute or raise any objection towards its liability to pay to the Petitioner. Therefore, the Court rejected the objection raised by the Respondent that writ is not maintainable since there is an Arbitration clause in the agreement, and held that Arbitration clause is not a bar to the Writ petition if the Respondent admitted its liability. Read More... WHETHER THE COURT, UNDER SECTION 11 OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 CAN REFER THE PARTIES TO ARBITRATION IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT? Recently, the Calcutta High Court in the case titled “Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. RREPL-KIPL (JV)” held that the Court, under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot refer the Parties to Arbitration in the absence of an Arbitration Agreement, on the ground that Respondent did not raise any objections to it. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court placed reliance on the Judgment titled ‘Pravin Electricals Pvt. Ltd. v. Galaxy Infra and Engineering Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 5 SCC 671 wherein it was held that in cases where it is not possible for a Court to remove manifestly and ex-facie invalid arbitration agreements and non-arbitrable disputes, then, in such cases, the issue of the existence of arbitration agreement can be referred to the arbitrator for determination as a preliminary issue. Read More... INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE, 2016 WHETHER THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNT OF A COMPANY CAN BE TREATED AS AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMPUTING LIMITATION? Recently, the Division bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court comprising of Hon’ble Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice JK Maheswari, in the case titled, “Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited v. Tulip Star Hotels Limited & Ors.”, held that the books of account of a company can be treated as an acknowledgement of liability for the purposes of computing Limitation under IB Code, 2016 read with Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that an application under Section 7 of the IB Code, 2016, would not be barred by limitation merely on the ground that it was filed after a period exceeding three years from the date of loan account being declared as NPA, provided that the Corporate Debtor acknowledged the debt prior to the expiry of three-year limitation period. Read More... WHETHER TARDINESS DISPLAYED BY A RESOLUTION APPLICANT CAN BE A GROUND TO REJECT THE RESOLUTION PLAN? Recently, the Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal in the case titled, “M/s. Cimco Projects Ltd. & Ors. v. Mr. Anup Kumar (Resolution Professional) M/s. Shivkala Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.” held that non serious and casual conduct of a resolution applicant is a reasonable ground to reject a resolution plan filed by such resolution applicant and approved by the committee of creditors of the Corporate Debtor. It was further held that the CIRP is a time bound process wherein the timeline has been prescribed for each and every step, therefore, the same cannot be continued for indefinite period. The Appellate Tribunal was observed that the Resolution Applicant's inactivity clearly indicated his unwillingness to follow the Resolution Plan, that had been approved by the CoC. Therefore, it is a sufficient ground to reject the request for approval of the resolution plan when it was unable to secure the attendance of the resolution applicant despite the issuance of bailable and non-bailable warrants. Read More... WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA APPLICABLE ON IBC PROCEEDINGS THAT ARE INCIDENTAL OR COLLATERAL IN NATURE? Recently, the Hon’ble Principal bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), comprising of the Hon’ble Justice Ashok Bhushan, Justice M. Satyanarayana Murthy and Barun Mitra, Technical Member, in the case titled, “Vikas Dahiya (Ex-Director of Golden Tobacco Ltd.) v. Arrow Engineering Ltd.”, held that a challenge to findings in incidental or collateral proceedings amounts to abuse of process of law and invokes the doctrine of Res Judicata. The Hon’ble Bench further held that the doctrine of res judicata doctrine is applicable to IB Code proceedings as well, thereby disallowing the Appellants from re-agitating the judgement that has attained finality, in order to prevent abuse of process of law. Additionally, the Appellate Tribunal also observed that since the verdict of the NCLAT was upheld by the Supreme Court, therefore, it cannot be regarded as erroneous. If the decision of this Tribunal is held to be incorrect and erroneous, then that would amount to reviewing the decision of NCLAT and Supreme Court both.  The NCLAT is not permitted to review either the Apex Court's or its own decisions. Therefore, since the Appellant had already raised certain issue before the Ld. Adjudicating Authority in the first round of litigation, raising it again in the incidental proceedings of the second round of litigation would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Read More... WHETHER THE ADJUDICATING AUTHORITY (AA) SHOULD EXAMINE SOMETHING MORE THAN ‘DEBT’ AND ‘DEFAULT’, WHILE DECIDING SECTION 7 IB CODE, 2016 PETITION? Recently, the Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal in the case titled “Anita Jindal v. M/S Jindal Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.” held that apart from ‘Debt’ and ‘Default’, the Ld. Adjudicating Authority has to look into the fact that the intention of the Applicant should meet the basic object of the IB Code, 2016 i.e., ‘Resolution’ and should not be limited to recovery of dues which is contrary to the basic intent of the Code. In view of the above, the Hon’ble Tribunal observed that the it is not the goal of the IB Code, 2016 to start CIRP to penalise a solvent company for failing to pay its debts. It was further opined that the phrase "Recovery" was purposely omitted out of the preamble of the IB Code, 2016 which is carefully worded to define the intent and objective of the IB Code, 2016 as "Reorganisation" and "Insolvency Resolution." This implies that even the Parliament has laid down a clear distinction between "Resolution" and "Recovery." Read More... WHETHER THE ADJUDICATING AUTHORITY CAN REJECT A SECTION 9 APPLICATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE RECEIPT OF MONEY WAS NOT ATTACHED ALONG WITH A BANKER’S CERTIFICATE? Recently, the Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal in the case titled “M/S Quippo Infrastructure Limited v M.R. Nirman Private Limited” held that a Banker's Certificate is not mandatorily required to trigger Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process ("CIRP") under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy code, 2016. In view of the above, the Appellate tribunal relied on the Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment in Macquarie Bank Limited v. Shilpi Cable Technologies Ltd. wherein it was held that since other documents can be used to substantiate the existence of a default, a certificate is not necessary as a supporting document. Read More... WHETHER THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL OR THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL HAVE THE DISCRETION TO ENTERTAIN AN APPLICATION OR APPEAL AFTER THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD OF LIMITATION? Recently, the Division bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court comprising of Hon’ble Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice J. K. Maheshwari, in the case titled “Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. Vs. Kew Precision Parts Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.” held that the Ld. Adjudicating Authority or the Appellate Authority have the discretion to entertain an application or appeal after the prescribed period of limitation as per the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the condition precedent for exercise of such discretion is the existence of sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal and/or the application within the period prescribed by limitation. It was further opined that whether the reason provided for the delay would constitute sufficient cause or not, would be dependent upon facts of each case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed while placing reliance on Section 7(5)(b) of the IB Code, 2016 that before rejecting an application under Section 7 of the IB Code, 2016, the NCLT is required to notify the applicant and provide the applicant a period of 7 days to rectify the defects in the application, but herein the NCLAT set aside the CIRP initiated against the Corporate Debtor as the same was barred by limitation in the absence of any acknowledgement of debt, without even considering the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. Read More... WHETHER THE LD. JUDICATING AUTHORITY IS COMPETENT TO PASS AN ORDER UNDER SECTION 66 OF IB CODE, 2016 DURING THE MORATORIUM BEING IMPOSED UNDER SECTION 14 OF IB CODE, 2016? Recently, the Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal in the case titled “Rakesh Kumar Jain v. Jagdish Singh Nain & Ors.” held that Ld. Adjudicating Authority is competent to pass an order under Section 66 of IB Code, 2016 during the Moratorium under Section 14 of the IB Code, 2016. The Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal further held that Moratorium imposed under Section 14 is not a bar for initiation of proceedings against the resolution professional of a company undergoing CIRP under Section 66 of the Code. In view of the foregoing, the Hon'ble tribunal was further pleased to hold that Section 14 prohibits institution and prosecution of proceedings against the Corporate Debtor but does not prohibit proceedings against the Resolution Professional of the Corporate Debtor. The Hon'ble Bench further observed that since both provisions are independent in nature and incorporated for different purposes, hence they should be construed harmoniously to give effect to the intent of the code and to avoid any inconsistency. Read More... WHETHER AN APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 9 OF THE IB, CODE 2016 CAN BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND THAT THE CORPORATE DEBTOR IS A GOING CONCERN AND AN MSME? Recently, the Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal in the case titled “M/s Agarwal Veneers v. Fundtonic Service Pvt. Ltd.” held that an application under Section 9 of the IB, Code 2016 can be dismissed on the ground that the Corporate Debtor is a going concern and an MSME. In view of the foregoing, the tribunal further observed that the preamble of IB Code, 2016 describes its intent and objective as "Reorganisation" and "Insolvency Resolution", thus specifically omitting the word, "Recovery".  The topic of "Reorganizing" or "Resolution of the Company" does not arise if IB Code, 2016 is solely utilised for the purpose of Debt Recovery, particularly when the amounts due are small and the Company is a solvent entity, i.e., an MSME providing employment and generating revenue and a going concern. Read More... WHETHER INSUFFICIENCY IN PAYMENT OF STAMP DUTY AFFECTS THE ADMISSION OF CIRP? Recently, the Hon’ble Principal Bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal comprising of Hon’ble Justice Ashok Bhushan, Dr. Alok Srivastava and Ms. Shreesha Merla in the case titled, “Mr. Praful Nanji Satra v. Vistra ITCL (India) Ltd. & Ors.” held that insufficiency in payment of stamp duty will not affect admission of CIRP under the IB Code, 2016 for a valid debt. The Hon’ble Tribunal further observed that the issue of debt being due and payable in the present case is not interdicted by any law; rather, only a technical issue with insufficient stamping has been raised, which can be resolved. Read More... WHETHER THE CREDITORS OTHER THAN THOSE WHO TRIGGERED THE INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROCESS CAN BE IMPLEADED AS PARTIES? Recently, the Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal in the case titled “V. Venkata Sivakumar v IDBI Bank Ltd.” held that Creditors other than those who triggered the Insolvency Resolution Process cannot be impleaded as parties. In view of the above, the Hon’ble Tribunal further observed that there is no provision in the IB Code, 2016 that enables the creditors, apart from those who initiated the Insolvency Resolution Process, to be added as parties. The Hon’ble Tribunal was further pleased to hold that a party can be impleaded only if it is termed to be a ‘necessary’ party, which means that the person is absolutely necessary to the constitution of the suit or appeal in the given proceeding before the court, tribunal, or authority. The Hon’ble Tribunal specifically observed that a mere interest of a ‘Party’ in the fruits of a `litigation’, cannot be a yardstick for his being impleaded as a `Party’. Read More... WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF THE IB CODE, 2016 WILL PREVAIL OVER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CUSTOMS ACT, 1962? Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled “Sundaresh Bhatt vs. Central Board of Indirect Taxes & Customs” held that the provisions of the IB Code, 2016 will prevail over the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962. In view of the above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that after the imposition of moratorium, the Customs Authority only had limited authority to assess/determine the amount of customs duty that was payable and then to file a claim with the Resolution Professional/IRP/Liquidator with regard to the balance custom duties, which would be handled in accordance with the IB Code, 2016 provisions. Further the Hon'ble court held that   in accordance with the IB Code, the IRP/Resolution Professional/Liquidator has the power to take possession of the Corporate Debtor's assets. Read More... Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 WHETHER A CHARGE OF MONEY LAUNDERING CAN BE BROUGHT AGAINST A PERSON WHO HAS BEEN FINALLY ACQUITTED OF THE SCHEDULED OFFENCE? Recently the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled “Parvathi Kollur vs State by Directorate Of Enforcement” held that a person acquitted of a scheduled offence cannot be prosecuted under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the Enforcement Directorate can lodge a complaint under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 only to investigate the charges of fraudulent proceeds of crime, however, such proceeds must be connected to a separate criminal offence (scheduled offence) committed by the individual. Read More... WHETHER THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE (ED) HAS POWER TO CARRY OUT SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROCEDURE UNDER SECTION 17 OF THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002, IF THE ACCUSED IS NOT GUILTY OF MONEY LAUNDERING UNDER SECTION 3 OF THE SAID ACT? Recently, the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta in the case titled, “M/s. Rashmi Metaliks Limited & Anr. v. Enforcement Directorate & Ors.” held that ED does not have the power to carry out search or seizure procedure under Section 17 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, if the accused is not guilty of Money Laundering under Section 3 of the said act. In light of the above, the Hon'ble Court further opined that a search or seizure carried out under Section 17 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 would not be legally maintainable if the authorized officer has no reason to believe that the person in relation to the premises is guilty of the "money-laundering" offense defined in Section 3 of the said act. The Hon’ble Court further observed that while Section 17 specifies the measures that an authorized officer may take to enter, search, and seize any record or property, whereas, Section 3 entails a different set of requirements and evidence, including that the person found guilty of the crime of "money-laundering" has knowingly engaged in or assisted in the commission of an activity connected with "proceeds of crime" (defined under Section 2(1)(u)) and has concealed, possessed, acquired, or used the same. It was further observed that the authority to search and seize only becomes concrete upon the accomplishment of the requirements outlined in Section 17(1) as well as the requirements of Sections 2(1)(u) and Section 3. Read More... CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1974 WHETHER A WITNESS CAN BE RECALLED OR RE-EXAMINED UNDER SECTION 311 OF CRPC AFTER CLOSING OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE? Recently, the division bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court comprising of Hon’ble Justice Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud and AS Bopanna in the case titled “Varsha Garg vs State of Madhya Pradesh” held that an application under section 311 CrPC to summon, examine, recall or re-examine of any material witness can be allowed at any stage and the same can be allowed even after closing of prosecution evidence. In the present case, the Applicant wanted to summon a witness in order to produce a decoding register being a vital piece of evidence which was objected by the Respondent on the ground that the Applicant is trying to fill a lacunae in its case by filing the present application at this stage. The Hon’ble Court, while placing reliance on the Judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court titled ‘Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI’ and the judgment titled ‘Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat’ to state that the powers of the Court under Section 311 CrPC are wide, allowed the application. Read More... WHETHER THE COURT CAN GRANT STAY OF INVESTIGATION AND/OR ANY INTERIM RELIEF UNDER SECTION 482 CRPC IN ANY CASE? Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled “Siddharth Mukesh Bhandari vs State of Gujarat” held that the courts can pass an order granting stay of an investigation and/or pass any interim relief in only the rarest of rare cases, while exercising powers under Section 482 of CrPC. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the court can pass such orders only in the most exceptional circumstances as laid down earlier by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Messrs. Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra” wherein it was held that because the power to quashing an F.I.R. is an exception, it should only be used sparingly in the "rarest of rare" category of cases. Read More... WHETHER THE MAINTENANCE PETITION UNDER SECTION 125 CRPC WILL BE COVERED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA ? Recently, a single judge bench of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court comprising of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma, in the case titled “Sunita & Anr. v. Vijay Pal @ Mohd. Sabir & Anr.” held that the maintenance petition under Section 125 CrPC is covered by the Principle of Res Judicata, due to its universal application and also for the reason that Section 125 CrPC proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature. The Hon’ble Court further observed that whenever a party contends a change in circumstances following the issuance of a maintenance order under Section 125 CrPC, the proper course of action would be to seek relief under Section 127 of the Code rather than filing a new petition under Section 125 of the Code. In view of the above, the Hon’ble court observed that the doctrine of Res Judicata has been evolved so as to avoid multiplicity of litigation regarding the same issues and to conclude a case after a dispute has been completely adjudicated, thus assuring the finality of legal proceedings. Read More... MISCELLANEOUS WHETHER PRE-INSTITUTION MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 12A OF COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT, 2015 IS MANDATORY? The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled, “M/S Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. & ors. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd.” held that pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of Commercial Courts Act is mandatory and any suit instituted in violation of the mandate under Section 12A is liable to be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that Section 12A was not initially a part of the Act, and by an amendment act of 2018, Section 12A was introduced. The Statement of Objects and Reasons makes it clear that Section 12A was to be made mandatory. The Court further added that the said provision has been inserted with respect to plaintiffs who do not intend to seek urgent interim relief. Read More... WHETHER A REVISABLE ORDER UNDER SECTION 115 OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (CPC) CAN BE PUT UNDER CHALLENGE BY INVOKING ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA? Recently, the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in the case titled, “Shibu & Anr v. Sreekumaran & Anr.” held that a revisable order under section 115 of CPC cannot be challenged by invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Court further opined that the correct course of action in a situation where an order is subject to revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code is to seek revision rather than filing an Original Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Read More... WHETHER A PRE-MATURE COMPLAINT FILED UNDER SECTION 138 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881 MAINTAINABLE ? Recently the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled, “Gajanand Burange vs Laxmi Chand Goyal” held that a complaint filed under Section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (“NI Act, 1881”) for cheque bounce case before the expiry of 15 days period is not maintainable as evident from bare reading of the provision mentioned under Section 138(c) of the NI Act, 1881. In view of the above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that there is no need to decide this issue as it was already decided in the earlier case of this Hon’ble Court in the case of “Yogendra Pratap Singh v Savitri Pandey and Another” wherein it was held that as Section 138 complaint filed before the expiry of the provided 15 days-time period, is no complaint in the eyes of law, and thus, no cognizance of an offence can be taken on the basis of such premature complaint. Read More... WHETHER A COURT CAN EXERCISE POWERS OF REVIEW IF THE ERROR IS NOT APPARENT ON THE FACE OF RECORD? Recently, a three-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court comprising of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, N.V. Ramana, Hon’ble Justice Hima Kohli and Hon’ble Justice Krishna Murari, in the case titled, “S. Madhusudhan Reddy vs V. Narayana Reddy” held that a court cannot exercise its powers of review if an error has to be detected through reasoning and it is not an error apparent on the face of the record. In view of the above, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the Court can fix an error under the pretext of using its review powers, but it cannot replace the previous viewpoint just because it is possible to adopt two viewpoints in a given situation. It was further observed that a review is also permissible if new or significant evidence comes to light after the decision has been made, provided that the party seeking the review was not aware of the evidence or was unable to present it at the time the decision was made despite exercising due diligence. Herein, the Hon’ble Court also opined that there is a clear difference between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. An erroneous decision can be corrected by a Superior Court, however, an error apparent on the face of the record can only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction. Read More... NEW DELHI X -3, Green Park Main, New Delhi, 110016, Telephones: +91 11 2652 0041-42 For further / specific information, please contact us at: info@tandonandco.com Disclaimer: The contents of this newsletter are intended for information purposes only, and parts of this newsletter are based on news reports and have not been independently verified. The newsletter is not in the nature of a legal opinion or advice. They may not encompass all possible regulations and circumstances applicable to the subject matter and readers are encouraged to seek legal counsel prior to acting upon any of the information provided therein. 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